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In service of an analysis of Lincoln’s Cooper Union Address, Kauffeld and Innocenti offer an 
account of the speech act of exhorting. Exhorting, they say, occurs in situations marked by 
conflicted principles, and an appeal to high-mindedness is a defining feature of the speech act. I 
wish to offer a small amendment that would extend the analysis to some objects of study that are 
far less admirable that Lincoln’s Cooper Union Address. 
 The amendment is a more generalized notion of exhorting. Exhortation does seem to 
occur only where some sort of conflictedness is expected, but the conflictedness may be of 
varied kinds, just some of which involve a clash between two principles. Exhortations may have 
a very wide range of content, including content that appeals not to people’s highest principles but 
to their basest motives. We can exhort one another to behave in a high-minded way, but we can 
also exhort one another to behave in an expedient way, and we can even exhort one another to 
behave in small and mean ways. We exhort one another to pursue self-interest, to exclude people 
different from ourselves, and to take risks that no rational calculation would support.  
 Often, but not always, exhortation involves some form of strong emotional appeal, 
whether positive (such as reverence) or negative (such as fear or greed). But emotional appeal is 
not a constitutive feature of exhorting; rather, emotional appeal is content that can make an 
exhortation more or less effective in achieving its goal. We can exhort one another without 
stirring the emotions at all, and of course exhorting, like any other speech act, can succeed in 
conveying meaning without achieving the speaker’s purpose.  
 Exhorting is like requesting, suggesting, and commanding in predicating a future act by 
the addressee and expressing the speaker’s intention to influence the addressee’s performance of 
that act. Exhorting differs from these closely related speech acts in the amount of pressure 
exerted on the addressee, in the source of that pressure, and in the burdens of proof a speaker 
incurs with each act. An exhortation is a high-pressure speech act, but one where the pressure 
does not originate in the speaker’s authority over the addressee, and where the speaker takes on a 
rather serious burden of proof. 
 The idea that speech acts can be differentiated by looking at contrasts on features like 
these is not new (Hancher, 1979). Searle and Vanderveken (1985) suggest that illocutionary 
forces are made up of combinations of “components” like “the mode of achievement of the 
illocutionary point” (p. 40) and “the degree of strength of the illocutionary point” (p. 41). Any 
natural language may or may not contain a verb that refers to a particular combination of 
attributes. Searle and Vanderveken (1985) do not give explicit attention to exhorting, but they 
closely examine directing, requesting, asking, urging, telling, requiring, demanding, 
commanding, ordering, forbidding, prohibiting, enjoining, permitting, suggesting, insisting, 
warning, advising, recommending, begging, supplicating, entreating, beseeching, imploring, and 
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praying. Of these, urging is most like exhorting: it has “a greater degree of strength” than 
requesting, but “neither the authority nor the power” of commanding. And it has a special 
preparatory condition “that the speaker has reasons for the course of action urged” (Searle & 
Vanderveken, p. 200), creating a specific burden of proof similar to those analyzed by Kauffeld 
(1998) for accusing and proposing.  
 As I read Kauffeld and Innocenti, they would distinguish exhorting from a speech act like 
urging on the basis of what kind of reason the speaker gives for the action. To count as an 
exhortation, the reason must be “high-minded.” The amendment I propose is that the reason 
given must have to do with the addressee’s conflictedness, whether that conflictedness is over 
principles, over desires, over fears, or over strictly practical concerns. The reason must indicate 
which of the conflicting impulses should prevail—so the highest principle when principles are in 
conflict, or the most prudent decision when goals are in conflict.  
 In a way, this is about the meaning of the English verb “exhort.” I don’t think high-
mindedness is part of its meaning. But the reason I choose this as the focus on my commentary is 
that exhortation is such a prominent fixture in contemporary public discourse that we really do 
need to think about it and try to understand how it works. An obvious place to devote critical 
attention is to serial exhortationist Donald Trump. He exhorts people often, and is so 
characterized in the press, but the conflictedness he addresses typically has nothing to do with 
principle. For example, he famously exhorted his Iowa supporters to go to the caucuses even if 
they didn’t feel like it, even if they were sick, even if they had just suffered losses or setbacks.  
 Exhortation appears with great regularity in the vaccination controversy, which is the 
subject of my own current work. Parents who refuse to vaccinate their children are increasingly 
exhorted by editorialists. But anti-vaccination activist groups also engage in exhortation, not only 
exhorting their own members to “think for themselves,” but also exhorting the medical science 
research community to behave more like scientists. For example, in these remarks at an Institute 
of Medicine workshop on Autism and the Environment, activist Mark Blaxill (in Institute of 
Medicine, pp. 273-274) exhorts the scientists present to fulfill a burden of proof that is required 
of them as scientists. He is talking about the argument that a recent increase in cases of autism is 
an artifact of changed diagnostic standards; when he says “we” should do actions, he means the 
scientific community, of which he himself is not a member. 
 
I want to talk a little bit about the burden of proof on time trends. I would make 
the suggestion that given the increases that we have seen, the notion that the 
reported increases are an artifact is a hypothesis, and it is a testable hypothesis.  
I’ll just take California as an example, because there is a pretty good surveillance 
system there, better than other parts of the country. A child born in California in 
the early 1980s had less than a 5 in 10,000 chance of becoming autistic. By the 
late 1990s, that rate was closer to 40 for 10,000, so that is roughly a 10-fold 
increase in about 15 years.  
The notion of that increase being artifactual has been tested in a lot of natural 
experiments. There is a hypothesis of diagnostic substitution that has been tested 
and falsified. There is the hypothesis of diagnostic expansion, that somehow we 
are changing the quality of the diagnoses. . . . 
Then I would ask the question in terms of studies, I think we should pursue 
studies to clarify uncertainties, but I would urge us to consider changing the 
burden of proof. Rather than saying the burden of proof is to demonstrate that all 
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this is real, I would say the burden of proof is to demonstrate that it is artifactual. 
(Institute of Medicine, pp. 273-274) 
 
 What’s interesting about exhortation, to me, is the way it demands either compliance or 
defense—unlike suggestions, which can simply be rejected, and requests, which can simply be 
refused. The forcefulness of exhortations needs more analysis. A promising target for theorizing 
is the kind of conflictedness that leads a speaker to exhort instead of simply to propose. I won’t 
attempt any theoretical analysis here, but just point to relevant variation in a few convenient 
examples.  
 The Cooper Union Address is complicated, because Lincoln had a live audience present, 
and a larger audience not present. He may have been exhorting each of these audiences assuming 
a different conflictedness for each. I am assuming that at Cooper Union the conflict Lincoln 
expected his live audience to feel was between a desire to see an end to slavery and a fear that 
actively opposing slavery would lead to disunion. I don’t like to ignore the long section of the 
speech aimed at Stephen Douglas, but it really does not seem to me to be part of, or preparation 
for, the exhortation to the live audience. The key passages of the exhortation, at least as I read it, 
are those that explicitly argue that Republicans should not allow the fear of disunion to keep 
them from voicing their conviction that slavery is wrong. 
 In the vaccination controversy, one form of conflictedness that activists like Mark Blaxill 
attribute to scientists is between a pursuit of truth and a pursuit of means to gain public 
compliance. No doubt we could find many contemporary cases of exhortation that picture the 
addressees as wavering between humanitarian impulses and selfish ones. In Trump’s exhortation 
to Iowa supporters, the conflictedness attributed to the audience is between two rather puny 
impulses: a desire to stay home tending to one’s own needs versus a desire to help Trump win 
the Iowa caucus.  
 A very important point to notice, and it will be my last point, is that the conflictedness at 
the heart of both Kauffeld and Innocenti’s account, and of mine, is a conflict that the speaker 
assumes to exist in the thoughts or feelings or goals of the addressee. When a speaker exhorts an 
addressee to put aside one set of their own considerations in favor of another set of their own 
considerations, the speaker has not only attributed both sets of considerations to the addressee, 
but has also implied that these are the only considerations relevant to the action. These 
attributions are part of the disagreement space around an exhortation, and we should expect to 
find that they are often the basis for objections. Anything a speaker attributes to an addressee is 
rhetorically risky—and we can learn both from those who get it right and from those who get it 
very wrong. 
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